How governors, ABN, military officers conspired to stall handover – IBB
Tamarauemi Ebimini
Former military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, has revealed how some civilian governors, elected under the National Republican Congress (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), secretly worked to prolong military rule while publicly advocating for a democratic transition.
In his newly released autobiography, presented in Abuja on Thursday, Babangida accused these governors of colluding with the notorious Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), led by Senator Arthur Nzeribe, as well as top military officers, to derail Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule.
The former military leader also admitted that he made a major mistake by allowing General Sani Abacha to remain in power under the Interim National Government (ING) led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, a decision he now regrets.
Babangida distanced himself from ABN’s activities, which played a key role in the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election won by Chief MKO Abiola.
He wrote: “The emergence of ABN took me by surprise. We later found out it was funded by Arthur Nzeribe, but we were already facing a credibility crisis, and many assumed we were behind it.”
He further disclosed that elected governors, who assumed office in January 1992, pressured him to postpone the presidential election, contradicting their public stance.
“Some governors, like ABN, urged us to delay the election, yet they returned to their party conventions to accuse me of having a hidden agenda to extend my stay in power. It was frustrating,” he lamented.
Babangida also revealed that Abacha and a group of military officers secretly worked to undermine his administration, accusing him of being the main obstacle to their plans.
“I was alarmed to discover that Abacha and a handful of others mobilized negative opinions against me within the military, portraying me as the problem and preparing for a coup,” Babangida wrote.
He explained that the ING was a compromise to balance the fierce opposition led by Abacha against the June 12 election results and those pushing for Abiola’s mandate to be upheld.
“To legally establish the ING, we directed Professors Ben Nwabueze and Clement Akpamgbo to draft Decree 61 of 1993,” he stated.
Despite concerns over Shonekan’s political inexperience, Babangida said the government decided to retain key military officers to support him, including Lt-Generals Joshua Dogonyaro, Aliyu Gusau, and Brigadier John Shagaya. However, he admitted that keeping Abacha in his role was a grave mistake.
Babangida also defended the controversial cancellation of the 1991 governorship primaries, citing widespread allegations of rigging.
To restore credibility, he disclosed that 13 key political figures were arrested, including General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Abubakar Rimi, Lateef Jakande, Bola Ige, Jim Nwobodo, Olusola Saraki, Solomon Lar, and Arthur Nzeribe.
However, he did not specify the exact roles each of them played in the alleged electoral malpractices.
Babangida’s revelations provide new insights into the power struggles and political intrigues that shaped Nigeria’s transition from military to civilian rule in the early 1990s.
